



judgment in favor of the City and the court's order granting the police officers' motion to dismiss. Upon careful review, we conclude that the grant of summary judgment in favor of the City was proper. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 & n.55, 694 (1978) (plaintiff seeking to impose liability on local government body under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must show official policy or widespread custom or practice of unconstitutional conduct that caused deprivation of constitutional rights); see also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (inadequacy of police training may serve as basis for § 1983 liability only where failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact); Mason v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 559 F.3d 880, 884-85 (8th Cir. 2009) (summary judgment reviewed de novo); Herring v. Canada Life Assurance Co., 207 F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2000) (in responding to properly supported summary judgment motion, opponent must come forward with specific facts showing there is genuine issue for trial). We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the police officers' motion to dismiss, in light of Storay's repeated failures to comply with the district court's orders; however, we conclude that the dismissal should have been without prejudice. See Doe v. Cassel, 403 F.3d 986, 989-90 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing complaint where, among other things, plaintiff repeatedly failed to comply with district court's orders; dismissal with prejudice should only be imposed in cases of wilful disobedience of court order or persistent failure to prosecute complaint).

Accordingly, the judgment is modified to reflect that the dismissal as to defendants Chad O'Kelly, Spencer Smith, and Ashley Helton is without prejudice, and the judgment as modified is affirmed. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.